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Abstract
Combating the surge of illegal wildlife trade (IWT) devastating wildlife popula-
tions is an urgent global priority for conservation. There are increasing policy
commitments to take action at the local community level as part of effective
responses. However, there is scarce evidence that in practice such interven-
tions are being pursued and there is scant understanding regarding how they
can help. Here we set out a conceptual framework to guide efforts to effectively
combat IWT through actions at community level. This framework is based on
articulating the net costs and benefits involved in supporting conservation ver-
sus supporting IWT, and how these incentives are shaped by anti-IWT inter-
ventions. Using this framework highlights the limitations of an exclusive focus
on ”top-down,” enforcement-led responses to IWT. These responses can dis-
tract from a range of other approaches that shift incentives for local people
toward supporting conservation rather than IWT, as well as in some cases ac-
tually decrease the net incentives in favor of wildlife conservation.
Introduction
The illegal wildlife trade crisis
Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) in wild species and products—
ranging from rhino horn and elephant ivory to medici-
nal plants, timber, shark fins and pangolins—is an urgent
global conservation challenge that has escalated dramat-
ically in the last decade (Challender & MacMillan 2014;
Wittemyer et al. 2014).
Since 2012, this crisis has attracted in excess of
U.S.$350 million in donor and government fund-
ing (Duffy & Humphreys 2014), and prompted high-
level intergovernmental policy initiatives including the
London (2014) and Kasane (2015) Conferences on IWT,
the African Union’s International Conference on Illegal
Exploitation and Illicit Trade in Wild Flora and Fauna
in Africa (Brazzaville; 2015), a UN General Assembly
Resolution (2015), and relevant commitments in the
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Sustainable Development Goals (2015). In terms of ad-
dressing poaching in source countries (as distinct from
demand in consumer states) these policy commitments
emphasize two broad areas: law enforcement and mea-
sures focused on communities and sustainable liveli-
hoods. However, to date the emphasis in most policy
debates and in donor resource allocation has been on
strengthening state- and private sector-led law enforce-
ment to reduce IWT. This enforcement is increasingly
militarized in response to increasingly militarized poach-
ing and to linkages with terrorism and state security
(Duffy 2014; Lunstrum 2014; Buscher & Ramutsindela
2016). Militarization of the antipoaching response in-
volves the use of military and paramilitary personnel (in-
cluding private military forces), training, and technolo-
gies (e.g., drones and high-powered weapons) (Lunstrum
2014), and at field level is associated with increasingly
punitive and lethal responses against suspected poachers
(e.g., Makoye 2014; Konopo 2016).
By contrast, community-level interventions to reduce
poaching for IWT have attracted far less attention and in-
vestment (IUCN SULi 2015). Details of how and where
community-level interventions should be implemented
and how they impact IWT remain vague, with desig-
nated resources and implementation largely lacking. Here
we present a conceptual framework that highlights the
incentives created by different types of policy interven-
tions for local community actors to either poach or to
protect wildlife. We use this framework to demonstrate
the limitations to a “top-down” enforcement-only IWT
strategy, including that such an approach can critically
undermine approaches based on community empower-
ment, engagement, and benefit-sharing. We argue that
diverse community-level approaches should and must be
integrated into more effective anti-IWT responses.
Incentives shaping community attitudes
and behavior in relation to IWT
Human decisions concerning conservation and exploita-
tion of natural resources are shaped fundamentally by
the incentives (financial and nonfinancial costs and
benefits) accrued, as well as culture, norms, beliefs,
values, lifestyles, and cognitive factors (Milner-Gulland &
Rowcliffe 2007; St John et al. 2015). How these factors
combine to affect individual decision-making varies
according to both context and individual preferences.
Studies in specific contexts have highlighted diverse
motivations for poaching within communities, including
(i) the requirement to meet subsistence needs, (ii) the
desire to improve financial well-being or social standing,
(iii) cultural practices and traditions, (iv) other nonin-
strumental motivations such as the desire to retaliate for
direct losses due to wildlife or for current or historical
perceived injustices (Duffy 2010; Harrison et al. 2015).
Community-based conservation (CBC) programmes seek
to achieve conservation outcomes—including reduced
poaching—predominantly by either increasing the finan-
cial benefits individuals receive through conservation,
increasing the opportunity cost of behaviors that are
incompatible with conservation or by instilling normative
compliance through providing public goods (Gibson &
Marks 1995). We build on and extend this thinking in
the context of IWT to develop a conceptual framework
for understanding individual decisions around poaching
(Figure 1).
It is a reasonable assumption that for wildlife conser-
vation to prevail, a necessary but not sufficient condi-
tion is that the expected net benefits (benefits minus
costs) of wildlife conservation to community members
with the means and opportunity of engaging in IWT must
be greater than the net costs (Figure 1). We include in
”conserving wildlife” any action with the effect of pro-
moting or furthering conservation, from passive (e.g., tol-
erating presence of wildlife) to active (e.g., protecting
wildlife from poaching). Similarly ”engaging in IWT” in-
cludes any action supporting IWT, from passively con-
cealing the identity of poachers to actively participating
in illegal extraction, trafficking and/or trade. We recog-
nize that the instrumental motivations included in this
framework are only part of the motivation for individual
decision-making. For example, colonial legacies including
the loss of legitimate forms of access to natural resources
may contribute to poaching as a form of protest (Duffy
2010). However, costs and benefits to community mem-
bers also interact with and shape broader social values
and norms around conservation and poaching, albeit in
complex ways mediated by perceptions of legitimacy, lo-
cal institutions and culture (Scanlon & Kull 2009).
A broad range of financial and nonfinancial social
and economic benefits and costs are associated with
both conserving wildlife and with engaging in IWT
(Figure 1). Critically, however, these costs and benefits
are not evenly distributed among individuals within a
community. For instance, some benefits of conserving
wildlife accrue to the individual, and vary widely accord-
ing to factors such as gender, ethnicity and status (e.g.,
gaining conservation-related jobs); while others accrue
at the community level and are more equitably shared
among community members (e.g., hunting lease pay-
ments to community land rights holders) (Naidoo et al.
2016). Similarly poachers can often be distinguished into
varying types, with different social and economic linkages
to local communities (Phelps &Webb 2015). This concep-
tual framework will yield different net incentives for dif-
ferent individuals, so needs to be applied with attention
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Figure 1 Conceptual framework for exploring the conditions likely to be required for local wildlife conservation in the context of IWT. Wildlife is more
likely to be conserved where net benefits (financial and non-financial) to individuals in local communities of retaining it are greater than net benefits of
engaging in IWT.
to the heterogeneity of costs and benefits amongst people
in a local community, varying types of poachers, and the
dynamic nature of payoffs to all actors over time.
To elaborate how this framework can apply to spe-
cific community members or poacher types is beyond
the scope of this paper. Rather, we present here a simple
conceptual model to help structure thinking about the
basic conditions that will need to be in place for success-
ful anti-IWT interventions. There are likely to be some
circumstances where community-level interventions to
help achieve the condition set out in Figure 1 are not
applicable; for instance, where poaching takes place in
remote areas far from settled communities and involv-
ing mobile gangs of poachers. However, this framework
is likely to be relevant wherever the behaviors and deci-
sions of local communities living with wildlife affect pat-
terns of IWT, including effective provision of intelligence
and cooperation in enforcement.
Applying this conceptual framework
to interventions to combat IWT
We now consider each component of this framework, set-
ting out how interventions to combat IWT can shape key
incentives. We then discuss the importance of interaction
between the payoffs, with specific reference to the impact
of state-led enforcement approaches on overall incentives
for IWT.
(i) Increasing benefits from wildlife conservation
Some anti-IWT interventions seek to shift incentives by
increasing the benefits realized by community members
from conserving wildlife (Box 1 in Figure 1). This follows
the well-established logic of common property resource
governance theory (Ostrom 1990) and its application
to wildlife in the form of Community-Based Natural
Resource Management (CBNRM) (Hulme & Murphree
2001).
Increasing the benefits from conservation can be pur-
sued through approaches such as strengthening commu-
nity ownership rights and/or capacity to use, manage
and benefit from wildlife (either for subsistence or com-
mercial purposes), including pursuing traditional cultural
practices linked to wildlife, participating in Payments for
Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes, securing jobs as com-
munity guards or in nature-based tourism enterprises,
or strengthening cooperation and communication with
conservation/wildlife management agencies (IUCN SULi
2015; Roe 2015). Such benefits can be powerful in mo-
tivating communities to be active and committed conser-
vation actors against poaching and IWT, as evidenced in
conservancies in Namibia (Naidoo et al. 2016) and Kenya
(Blackburn 2016). Effectiveness of different interventions
will vary according to local context: for example, benefits
from tourism are only feasible where certain conditions
are met, such as political stability, tourism infrastructure
and scenic landscapes (Naidoo et al. 2016).
CBC and CBNRM initiatives have failed when the
generated benefits have been insufficient to offset in-
dividual costs, too diffuse to result in the creation of
norms in favor of conservation, or captured by govern-
ment/community elites (Child 1995; Gibson & Marks
1995). As such, increasing benefits from conservation
is likely to be most effective in reducing IWT in those
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cases where the benefit flows to local communities are
conditional on conservation outcomes, that is, where
better conservation outcomes are associated with in-
creased or more secure benefits and vice versa; where
benefits are experienced by a significant proportion of
the community; and where accountability for these pos-
itive changes can be demonstrated clearly, that is, where
changes in conservation status can be clearly attributed
to actions of specific people or groups. This is the case
with many sustainable use approaches, and some PES
schemes (e.g., Lewis et al. 2011; Naidoo et al. 2016).
(ii) Decreasing the costs of living with wildlife
Promoting conservation over IWT can also involve efforts
to reduce costs associated with conserving wildlife (Box 2
in Figure 1), including threats to personal security, live-
stock or crops; resource competition; and disease trans-
mission between livestock and wildlife. Communities are
often substantially disadvantaged by these impacts, par-
ticularly where they pose risks to life or livelihoods, lead-
ing to anger, resentment, and retaliatory poaching (Dick-
man 2010; Twinamatsiko et al. 2014). Interventions to
reduce costs can include the construction of physical bar-
riers such as fences to keep wildlife away from crops and
livestock, problem animal control, and insurance or com-
pensation schemes for crops damaged by wildlife (Hoare
2012). Reducing these costs may assist (or indeed be nec-
essary) in shifting overall incentives for local people away
from IWT and in favor of conservation. However, alone
these interventions are unlikely to be sufficient, particu-
larly in the context of escalating prices for illicitly sourced
wildlife products (Challender & MacMillan 2014).
(iii) Reducing the benefits of engaging in IWT
A third type of anti-IWT intervention at community level
aims to reduce the benefits that people can gain through
engaging in IWT (Box 3 in Figure 1), through means such
as reducing offtake of wildlife through increasing detec-
tion of snares (Linkie et al. 2015) or ”devaluing” wildlife
items, for example, infusing rhino horns with chemicals
(Ferreira et al. 2014). While such interventions may like-
wise be important in shifting overall payoffs away from
IWT, in most cases they will need to be augmented with
other approaches to effectively reduce it.
(iv) Increasing costs of engaging in IWT
The most widely emphasized response to IWT focuses
on increasing the costs associated with engaging in it
(Box 4 in Figure 1). This is typically through state-led
(sometimes private) law enforcement (Roe et al. 2015a),
which can involve tightening restrictions on harvest and
trade; increasing the probability of detection and capture;
increasing the chances of successful prosecution; and/or
increasing sanctions and penalties (Duffy 2014; St John
et al. 2015).
The costs of engaging in IWT can also be increased
through approaches that empower and engage commu-
nities as active and motivated partners in law enforce-
ment (Lotter & Clark 2014; Roe 2015; Naidoo et al.
2016). In Mali, for example, the Mali Elephant Project
has supported local communities to establish voluntary
game patrols to monitor elephant populations and de-
tect poaching incursions (Roe 2015). In many cases, lo-
cal residents are best placed to know what is happen-
ing on the ground, including who is poaching and their
movements—information typically scarce in the IWT
context. They can apply social and informal sanctions
to members of their communities, and can be the ”eyes
and ears” of formal enforcement authorities as scouts,
informants and guides that work cooperatively through
joint patrols or information sharing (Lotter & Clark 2014;
Wilkie et al. 2016). These approaches will be strongest
where people feel a strong sense of ownership or stew-
ardship over wildlife—where they are protecting ”their”
wildlife (Wilkie et al. 2016). Mechanisms can be estab-
lished to enable people to easily, anonymously and safely
report information, increasingly through mobile tech-
nologies. This approach is relevant wherever IWT takes
place in or around areas where communities live, regard-
less of whether local residents are involved in IWT or
not. Given the prevalence of IWT driven by ”outsiders”
and the increasingly militarized nature of some IWT, it
is vital that community members are not endangered by
such interventions, and they will typically need strong
and reliable backup from well-equipped authorities with
the power of arrest. Ample evidence shows that law en-
forcement and crime prevention is most effective when
citizens and armed authorities both contribute (Hawdon
& Ryan 2011).
A further popular anti-IWT strategy is providing ”al-
ternative livelihoods” for local communities, understood
here as those not based on (legal or illegal) use of wild
resources (e.g., small-scale farming, retail enterprises).
The most commonly cited rationale for these interven-
tions is that by providing an alternative source of income
they reduce dependence on income from IWT. They also
provide a mechanism for occupying limited time and re-
sources that might otherwise be allocated to IWT. In some
cases, the ability to benefit from alternative livelihoods
interventions is made conditional on wildlife conserva-
tion. In these cases, the interventions serve to increase
the costs of engaging in IWT (thus falling within Box
4 in Figure 1). However, the evidence for the effective-
ness of alternative livelihoods approaches (in terms of
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increased ownership rights 
increased capacity to benefit 
Conservation Benefits 
improved relationship with 
conservation authorities 
Conservation Costs 
possible raised prices due to 
restricted supply 
IWT Benefits 
effective community-led or 
cooperative enforcement 
IWT Costs 
tightened access 
use restrictions 
Conservation Benefits 
heavy-handed or unjust 
policing 
Conservation Costs 
possible raised prices due to 
restricted supply 
IWT Benefits 
increased effort required  
risk of incarceration or fines 
IWT Costs 
no change 
Conservation Benefits 
no change 
Conservation Costs 
decrease 
IWT Benefits 
increased effort required  
risk of incarceration or fines 
IWT Costs 
A: How enforcement interventions seek to change incentives to conserve and engage in IWT 
B: How enforcement interventions may inadvertently change incentives to conserve and engage in IWT 
C: How approaches that empower and engage communities may change incentives to conserve and engage in IWT 
-
-
-
>
>
>
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-
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Figure 2 Potential impacts of interventions to combat IWT on incentives facing local community members. Dotted lines indicate more speculative
impacts.
delivering conservation outcomes) is scant (Wicander &
Coad 2014; Roe et al. 2015b). In particular, it is unclear
if the provision of benefits from alternative livelihoods
interventions replaces or simply supplements IWT ben-
efits (Wright et al. 2016). There are some examples in
which alternative livelihoods have been used as one com-
ponent of a package of interventions to tackle IWT (Lotter
& Clark 2014) or where “reformed poachers associations”
have been established on the premise of provision of al-
ternative sources of income-earning opportunities (see
Harrison et al. 2015). But, as with other nonconditional
conservation incentives, we are skeptical about their
wide-scale adoption in combating IWT.
What’s wrong with current approaches?
The dominant approach to countering IWT based on ”top
down” enforcement (Figure 2A) has a number of seri-
ous limitations. While regulation and enforcement clearly
have an important role to play in reducing IWT, an exclu-
sive focus on this element of our framework has several
potentially perverse collateral impacts: it ignores impor-
tant ramifications for other costs and benefits that shape
incentives for IWT; it overlooks the potential for reducing
incentives for IWT through strategies that change other
incentives; and it fails to leverage (and indeed may im-
pair) more nuanced and locally engaged forms of moni-
toring and enforcement (e.g., community-led efforts).
Top down (and particularly militarized) enforcement
strategies frequently not only change the costs of engag-
ing in IWT, but can produce a range of other (sometimes
unanticipated) impacts that can collectively undermine
conservation incentives (see Figure 2B). Where enforce-
ment efforts are upholding local rights, providing se-
curity and/or defending a community’s assets they will
strengthen community benefits from conservation and
may well increase support for it. But poorly directed or
heavy-handed efforts can impose unjustified restrictions
on people’s use of wildlife resources, infringe rights, and
undermine the benefits that local people can gain from
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conservation and wildlife protection. Interventions jus-
tified by cracking down on IWT can, for example, curtail
livelihood benefits from legitimate use of wildlife through
subsistence use, trade, or trophy hunting programmes.
Heavy-handed enforcement can further involve unjust
persecution, harassment and human rights abuses by au-
thorities (Corry 2015), increasing the perceived costs of
living alongside wildlife. When people lose benefits and
feel increasing costs of conservation, this can lead to
anger and resentment—traits associated with poaching in
some studies (Twinamatsiko et al. 2014).
It is also plausible that enforcement-focused strategies
(top-down or otherwise) can actually increase the indi-
vidual benefits gained from IWT, when they reduce the
supply of illegal products but demand remains constant
or indeed increases with product rarity (Chen 2015). In
these circumstances prices for illegal products are ex-
pected to continue to rise and may further incentivize
IWT.
By contrast, approaches that explicitly seek to em-
power and engage communities in combating IWT can
harness multiple levers to shift conservation incentives in
a positive direction (Figure 2C), while safeguarding and
promoting critical human rights and livelihood concerns
(see e.g., IUCN SULi et al. 2015, pp. 15–19). Community-
led interventions can motivate community members to
protect wildlife through simultaneously supporting their
rights to benefit from wildlife resources and associated
sense of ownership, seeking to increase the benefits they
gain through doing so and minimizing the costs, as well
as fostering more efficient and powerful forms of enforce-
ment through drawing on the energies and capacities
of motivated community members as active partners in
combating IWT. While enforcement plays a critical role
in this model, it is enforcement that upholds and pro-
tects the rights of individual community members, rather
than potentially undermining them. Integrating these ap-
proaches offers a far more coherent and, where success-
ful, more powerful package of incentives raising far fewer
social concerns than purely enforcement-focused inter-
ventions.
Where to from here?
Community-based approaches alone are unlikely to be
adequate to stem IWT, particularly in the face of es-
calating commodity values for wildlife traded illegally,
the militarization of poaching, and the involvement of
”outsiders,” including sophisticated organized crime net-
works, in IWT (Duffy 2014). A critical need is for better
understanding of where and how community-level ap-
proaches can effectively help combat IWT (Biggs et al.
2016). State-led and/or private law enforcement will
rightly continue to play an essential role in successful nat-
ural resource management and in the battle against IWT
(Phelps et al. 2014). However, a frequent, often narrow
preoccupation with this approach may be compromising
the possibilities for exploring fruitful and complemen-
tary pathways that engage and support communities—
risking the undermining of anti-IWT efforts by alienating
or disenfranchising local residents in source areas of il-
licit wildlife goods. Improving relations with communities
and increasing incentives for conservation—in ways that
effectively meet the requirements of Figure 1—creates
the necessary backbone for successful enforcement by
providing a critically needed enabling environment. In
addressing the current devastating spate of IWT it is
urgent and essential that interventions combine the
best of both ”top-down” enforcement and diverse
community-engagement approaches, while always care-
fully considering the various feedbacks and unintended
consequences they can cause.
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